Trust

The trust service is the SIGNATIF trust-graph: jurisdiction trust lists per framework, an M-of-K multi-witness master list, and live reason-to-retroactivity revocations. Every response is signed in the tree-head domain — signature headers name their suites and key ids so a verifier picks the right public keys from /keyring.

In the reference deployment it binds 127.0.0.1:8391. Reads are public; mutations and /admin/log require UNIDPP_TRUST_ADMIN_TOKEN when set.

Endpoints

Endpoint	What
GET /	discovery (endpoints, signing domain, revocation semantics)
GET /healthz	liveness
GET /keyring	the service keyring (verifier pinning)
GET /graph	the trust graph
GET /anchor-bundle?jurisdiction=	an anchor bundle per jurisdiction
GET /trust-lists?at=&jurisdiction=&framework=	trust lists
GET /trust-lists/{jur}?at=	one jurisdiction’s list
POST /trust-lists	register a trust list
POST /trust-lists/{jur}/entries	upsert a trust entry
GET /master-list	the M-of-K master list
POST /master-list/witnesses	set the witness set
POST /master-list/entries	upsert a master entry
GET /revocations?at=&known_by=&window=&subject=&retroactive=	revocation declarations, both readings
POST /revocations	declare a revocation
POST /nodes · POST /edges	graph registration
GET /admin/log?limit=&offset=	audit log (admin)

Example (recorded against the reference deployment)

$ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8391/keyring | jq '{mode, roles: (.roles | keys)}'
{
  "mode": "seeded-dev",
  "roles": [
    "sign-ecdsa-p256",
    "sign-ed25519"
  ]
}

$ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8391/trust-lists | jq '.trust_lists | length'
1

seeded-dev flags the deterministic dev keyring; production sets a signing seed (see security posture).

Revocation semantics

The reason codes decide whether history survives:

• Prospective reasons — key-compromise, cessation, supersession, affiliation-change: prior as-of verifications stay valid (timestamping protects, as with code signing).
• Retroactive reasons — misissuance, fraudulent-issuance, authority-compromised: void ab initio within the explicit distrust window [start, end], re-valid outside it.

Both readings are computable per declaration: responses carry known_at_cutoff and voids_at_as_of.

Response signing

Every body is signed over the exact bytes; headers carry x-sig-domain (tree-head), x-sig-ed25519 + x-sig-key-id-ed25519, and x-sig-ecdsa-p256 + x-sig-key-id-ecdsa-p256. Cache policy per response: current-state answers revalidate; point-in-time (?at=) answers are immutable, max-age=86400; mutations are never stored.

SIGNATIF has no service-response domain; tree-head (the operator’s signed statement of state, as used for transparency-log signed tree heads) is the documented adaptation — stated in the discovery document, not hidden.

Environment

Manifest-rendered:

Variable	Meaning	Default
UNIDPP_TRUST_BIND	listen address	127.0.0.1:8091
UNIDPP_TRUST_ADMIN_TOKEN	Bearer token for mutations and /admin/*; unset = open	unset
UNIDPP_TRUST_STATE_FILE	append-only JSONL journal	none

Direct environment:

Variable	Meaning	Default
UNIDPP_TRUST_NO_SEED_FIXTURES	1 skips seeding the fixture trust graph at first start	unset (seed on)
UNIDPP_TRUST_SIGN_SEED	deterministic signing seed (production identity)	dev seed
UNIDPP_TRUST_DEV_SEED	the dev seed value	documented dev seed

Semantics and degradation

• Fixtures by default. First start seeds a fixture trust graph so the service is useful to a verifier out of the box; disable with UNIDPP_TRUST_NO_SEED_FIXTURES=1 for a clean production instance.
• Journal replay on start; the graph, lists, and revocation ledger all restore from the journal.
• No silent unsigned answers. If a response cannot carry its signature headers, that is a bug, not a degradation mode — the signing keyring is constructed at start or the process exits.